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ARTICLES
IMPROVING REGULATORY ANALYSIS
AT INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
CARY COGLIANESE*
Independent regulatory agencies—such as the Federal Communications
Commission, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Securities and Exchange
Commission—regularly issue highly consequential regulations. When they issue
their regulations, however, they do not have to meet the same requirements for
analysis that apply to other agencies. Consequently, courts, policymakers, and
scholars have voiced serious reservations about a general lack of high-quality
prospective analysis of new regulations at independent agencies. These agencies’
track records with retrospective analysis of their existing regulations raise similar
concerns. In this Article, I approach the quality of regulatory analysis at
independent agencies as a policy problem, assessing the current quality and
offering possible solutions Congress could adopt to improve these agencies’
regulatory analysis. I present three options for improving prospective analysis
by independent agencies: (1) continuing to allow courts to encourage better
analysis; (2) subjecting independent agencies to the same White House review
that currently applies to executive agencies; and (3) amending the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) to impose a requirement for analysis but not
*

Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, and
Director, Penn Program on Regulation, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am
grateful for assistance provided by Laurent Abergel, Justin Berg, and Kelly
Funderburk, as well as John Boulé, Laura Collins, Jody A. Stafford, and other members
of the staff of the American University Law Review. This Article builds on testimony
before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs
Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Federal Management. See Reviewing
Independent Agency Rulemaking: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs and Fed.
Mgmt. of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs, 114th Cong. 79 (2016)
(statement of Cary Coglianese, Edward B. Shils Professor of Law, Director, Penn
Program on Regulation, University of Pennsylvania).

733

734

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:733

White House review. The UMRA option would best balance the desire to
improve independent agencies’ prospective regulatory analysis with the
prevailing norms of autonomy that surround these agencies. In addition to
improving prospective analysis, independent agencies should seek to produce
more rigorous retrospective analysis of their existing regulations, both to improve
the substantive performance of their existing regulations and to learn better what
to expect when analyzing new regulations. I thus offer options for improving
retrospective analysis by independent agencies, each of which could be adopted
without undermining autonomy norms. Ultimately, to improve independent
regulatory agencies’ performance in fulfilling their public missions, these
agencies’ leaders must make smarter regulatory decisions—and the first step
toward smarter decisions lies with improving regulatory analysis.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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A. Make No Legislative Changes ................................... 745
B. Codify the Requirements of Executive Order
12,866 for Independent Agencies ............................ 746
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last fifteen years, a group of seventeen major independent
agencies—including the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)—collectively issued
nearly 5000 federal regulations.1 Yet not one of these rules has been
1. The Paperwork Reduction Act defines “independent regulatory agency” by
listing nineteen federal agencies:
[T]he Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the
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subject to the usual legislative or presidential requirements for
regulatory analysis that executive branch agencies must follow when
developing new rules.2 The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)
and Executive Order 12,866 exempt independent agencies from the
normal requirements for regulatory impact analysis.3 Perhaps not
surprisingly then, over forty percent of major regulations from
independent agencies reportedly lack any information on the anticipated
costs or benefits of these new rules.4
To be sure, all agencies could improve their analysis of regulations, but
regulatory scholars and commentators have raised particular concern in
Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Federal
Housing Finance Agency, the Federal Maritime Commission, the Federal
Trade Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Mine
Enforcement Safety and Health Review Commission, the National Labor
Relations Board, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission, the Postal Regulatory Commission, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection, the Office of Financial Research, [and] Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency . . . .
44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012). A search in the Federal Register using Lexis yielded 4848
final rules issued by these listed agencies from 2002 to 2016. The search yielded no
final rules issued by two of these agencies: Interstate Commerce Commission (which
no longer exists) and the Office of Financial Research.
2. 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (2012) (mandating that executive branch agencies that seek
to develop a rule which may result in the private-sector expenditure of $100 million or
more annually prepare an analysis of the anticipated benefits and costs of the rule);
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app.
at 802–06 (establishing principles and procedures for executive branch agencies to
conduct benefit-cost analyses of new rules and subject them to review by the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs). Executive Order 12,866, adopted by President
William J. Clinton, was reaffirmed by President Barack Obama in Exec. Order No.
13,563 § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 816–
17. President Donald J. Trump has retained both executive orders.
3. UMRA’s definition of an agency “does not include independent regulatory
agencies.” 2 U.S.C. § 658(1) (2012), incorporated by 2 U.S.C. § 1502. The agencies
covered by Executive Order 12,866 are those covered by the Paperwork Reduction Act
“other than those considered to be independent regulatory agencies.” Exec. Order
No. 12,866 § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. 641.
4. The Office of Management and Budget analyzed major regulations that
thirteen independent agencies issued between 2005 and 2014 and found that only
eighty-four out of 143 major regulations (fifty-nine percent) issued by those
independent agencies contained at least some information about costs or benefits—a
necessary but quite minimal criterion for sound analysis. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS
OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES
REFORM ACT 97–98, app. c (2015) https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
default/files/omb/inforeg/2015_cb/2015-cost-benefit-report.pdf.
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recent years about weak or insufficient analysis at independent regulatory
agencies.5 The emergence of such concern seemed to coincide with
much more active and consequential regulatory agendas at a number of
major independent agencies during the Obama Administration, as
illustrated by the FCC’s 2015 adoption of an “Open Internet” regulation6
and the SEC’s and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s
(CFTC) promulgation of major new regulations under the 2010 DoddFrank financial reform legislation.7 Litigants, as well as some judges and
commentators, have criticized independent regulators for failing to
produce adequate analysis before adopting new regulations, with courts
remanding some agencies’ rules for further analysis.8

5. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Structure of the
Administrative State: The Case of Financial Services Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 545, 549
(2017) (providing case studies that “illustrate the shortcomings of independent agencies
with respect to cost-benefit analysis”); Joseph P. Mohorovic, Improving Regulatory Analysis at
Independent Agencies, REG. REV. (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/
01/10/mohorovic-improving-regulatory-analysis-independent-agencies
(observing
that “too often I have seen [the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)] depart
from . . . analytical best practices, which then can lead to misinformed and even unnecessary
regulations” and arguing that “the kind of cost-benefit analysis required of executive branch
agencies would lead to better rules at CPSC and other independent agencies”).
6. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 47 C.F.R. pt. 8 (2015) (codifying rules
promulgated by the FCC in response to the net-neutrality debate). The FCC subsequently
repealed this order after President Donald J. Trump was elected and appointed a new chair
of the FCC. FCC Acts to Restore Internet Freedom (Dec. 14, 2017), http://transition.fcc.gov/
Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2017/db1214/DOC-348261A1.pdf.
7. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Final Rules, Final Guidance, Final Exemptive Orders, and Other Final
Actions, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/
DoddFrankAct/Dodd-FrankFinalRules/ index.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) (listing
the CFTC’s seventy-nine finalized rules, orders, and guidance actions under the DoddFrank Act); Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml (last
visited Feb. 7, 2018) (detailing the final rules adopted by the SEC under the sixty-seven
mandatory rulemaking provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act).
8. For recent litigation raising challenges to independent financial regulators’
analyses, see Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Am. Equity
Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 172–73 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Chamber of Commerce v.
SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 894 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 145
(D.C. Cir. 2005); Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d 373, 384, 390,
437–38, (D.D.C. 2014); Inv. Co. Inst. v. CFTC, 891 F. Supp. 2d 162, 190 (D.D.C. 2012),
aff’d, 720 F.3d 370, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n v. CFTC, 877 F.
Supp. 2d 259 (D.D.C. 2012). Not all of these challenges, of course, have been successful.
Litigants raised similar objections, unsuccessfully, in an action challenging the FCC’s
decision making that led to its Open Internet Order in 2015, arguing that, as Gordon
Crovitz has stated, “the FCC skipped the economic analysis.” L. Gordon Crovitz,
‘Economics-Free’ Obamanet,’ WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2016, 6:20 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/economics-free-obamanet-1454282427.
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Much concern to date has focused on prospective regulatory analysis,
which takes place before agencies adopt new regulations, informing
decision makers about whether to proceed with new rules or how to design
them. But another type of analysis matters too: retrospective analysis, which
takes place after an agency promulgates a rule and seeks to measure its
impacts. Retrospective and prospective analysis are interrelated. Prospective
analysis clarifies the goals of a new regulation and identifies expected
outcomes; this in turn informs the subsequent process of retrospective
analysis by identifying benchmarks against which the regulation’s actual
effects can be assessed.9 Conversely, when retrospective analysis shows how
well a regulation has (or has not) worked, it informs future prospective
analysis about whether to retain or modify that regulation, as well as how to
design other regulations.10 Both types of analysis—prospective and
retrospective—are essential ingredients for smart decision making about
how to deliver high-quality regulatory outcomes.11 Although litigation and
scholarly work has so far focused most attention on the adequacy of
prospective analysis at independent agencies,12 no reason exists to think
that these same agencies are doing any better than other agencies when it
comes to evaluating their rules after the fact.
The purpose of this Article is to gauge what we know about how
independent agencies are performing both types of analysis and to offer
steps that Congress might take to encourage improvements in both kinds
of analysis at such agencies. In this Article, I have in mind primarily the
agencies that Congress has stipulated to be independent in its definition of

9. CARY COGLIANESE, MEASURING REGULATORY PERFORMANCE: EVALUATING THE
IMPACT OF REGULATION AND REGULATORY POLICY, Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev.
Expert Paper No. 1, at 18 (Aug. 2012), http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatorypolicy/
1_coglianese%20web.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZZZ-NERP] [hereinafter COGLIANESE,
MEASURING REGULATORY PERFORMANCE] (observing that “whatever the criteria that are
used in prospective impact analysis can also be used to evaluate regulations after the fact”).
10. Id. at 47–50 (elaborating an integrated framework for using “[e]valuation research
[to] inform decision making about a broad range of policy relevant questions,” including
prospective decision making about new rules).
11. Cary Coglianese & Lori D. Snyder Bennear, Program Evaluation of Environmental
Policies: Toward Evidence-Based Decision Making, in DECISION MAKING FOR THE ENV’T: SOC.
AND BEHAVIORAL SCI. RESEARCH PRIORITIES 246, 249–52, 263 (Gary D. Brewer & Paul C.
Stern eds., 2005); Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent Regulatory
Experimentation and Evaluation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 111, 116, 121–22
(David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009); Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and
Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1111, 1121 [hereinafter Coglianese, Empirical
Analysis]; Cary Coglianese, Thinking Ahead, Looking Back: Assessing the Value of Regulatory
Impact Analysis and Procedures for its Use, 3 KLRI J.L. & LEGIS. 5, 14, 23 (2013).
12. See supra notes 5, 8 and accompanying text; infra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
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the term in the Paperwork Reduction Act,13 but I recognize that what
constitutes an independent agency can itself be open to discussion.14 Agency
independence has long been understood in terms of structural features
related to the appointment of agency heads—for-cause removal restrictions,
fixed terms, and, with multi-member agencies, bipartisan distribution
requirements.15 Agencies with these features have generally been considered
independent, while those lacking them are instead considered executive
agencies, operating under the closer oversight of the White House. More
recently, though, some scholars have properly recognized structural
independence as more of a matter of degree, rather than as a binary
characteristic.16 Other commentators have acknowledged that de jure
structural independence is but one possible, even if not always sufficient,
means by which agency officials can make de facto independent judgments
about how best to advance a statutory mandate and deliver public value.17
13. See supra note 1 (defining “independent regulatory agency” in the Paperwork
Reduction Act by listing nineteen federal agencies).
14. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, The Debate over Independent Agencies in Light of
Empirical Evidence, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215.
15. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 257, 259 (detailing the three main structural features characteristic of
“independent” agencies).
16. Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and
Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 772–73 (2013) (arguing that agencies
are best viewed on a sliding scale of independence from presidential influence); see
also David E. Lewis & Jennifer L. Selin, Political Control and the Forms of Agency Independence,
83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1487, 1507 (2015) (developing “numerical estimates of agency
independence”); CHRISTOPHER CARRIGAN & LINDSEY POOLE, STRUCTURING REGULATORS:
THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN ON REGULATORY BEHAVIOR AND PERFORMANCE,
Penn Program on Reg. Research Paper, at 7 (2015), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/
files/4707-carriganpoole-ppr-researchpaper062015pdf (discussing “the notion that
independence is best thought of as a continuum”).
17. See, e.g., CARY COGLIANESE, LISTENING, LEARNING, LEADING: A FRAMEWORK FOR
REGULATORY EXCELLENCE 42 (2015), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/4946pprfinalconvenersreportpdf (noting that formal legal structures do not necessarily
guarantee agency independence); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CREATING A
CULTURE OF INDEPENDENCE: PRACTICAL GUIDANCE AGAINST UNDUE INFLUENCE 9 (2017),
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/creating-a-culture-of-independence_5jfxjd55fzd2.pdf?
contentType=%2fns%2fOECDBook%2c%2fns%2fBook&itemId=%2fcontent%2fboo
k%2f9789264274198-en&mimeType=application%2fpdf&containerItemId=%2fcontent
%2fserial%2f24151440&accessItemIds=&option6=imprint&value6=http%3a%2f%2fo
ecd.metastore.ingenta.com%2fcontent%2fimprint%2foecd (finding that the “de
jure” independence found in legal structures does not necessarily provide the “culture
of independence” that is necessary for regulators to function independently and
effectively); Peter Conti-Brown, The Institutions of Federal Reserve Independence, 32 YALE J.
ON REG. 257, 261 (2015) (arguing that the complex legal structure of the Federal Reserve,
which was intended to balance independence and accountability, does not always serve its
intended purpose); CARRIGAN & POOLE, supra note 16, at 4–7 (discussing how the
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Even the independent agencies listed in the Paperwork Reduction
Act do not uniformly share the same structural features. Most have
agency heads protected by for-cause removal limitations, but some do
not (e.g., the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and
the Office of Financial Research).18 Moreover, the Paperwork
Reduction Act’s list does not include some agencies headed by
administrators who do enjoy for-cause removal protection (e.g., Social
Security Administration).19 Despite these nuances, the list of agencies
stipulated as independent in the Paperwork Reduction Act proves
particularly relevant to this Article’s treatment of prospective and
retrospective regulatory analysis because existing regulatory analysis
requirements apply to executive agencies but do not apply to agencies
that the Paperwork Reduction Act lists as independent.
In each of the two parts of this Article that follow, I turn first to what we
can infer about the quality of independent agencies’ analyses, suggesting that
it is harder than it might seem to say definitively how deficient are the analyses
conducted at these agencies. However, on the not-unreasonable assumption
that independent agencies’ analyses are far from optimal in their current
level of rigor and completeness, I next turn in each subsequent part of this
Article to possible legislative actions that might help encourage agencies to
improve their analysis. I begin with prospective analysis in Part I, followed
with a similar treatment of retrospective analysis in Part II.
I.

PROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS

Although administrative law scholars sometimes pine for a bygone
era when so-called informal rulemaking was truly informal20—if such a

structure and composure of regulatory bodies impacts their effectiveness). See generally
Miller, supra note 14, at 215.
18. The OCC is located within the Department of the Treasury. The enabling statute
for the OCC section explicitly lacks for-cause removal protection, instead providing that
the Comptroller of the Currency “shall hold his office for a term of five years unless sooner
removed by the President, upon reasons to be communicated by him to the Senate.” 12
U.S.C. § 2 (2012). The statutory provision establishing the Director of the Office of
Financial Research lacks any provision on removal, indicating the absence of any for-cause
protection. 12 U.S.C. § 5342(b).
19. Admittedly, the Paperwork Reduction Act’s enumerated list is not intended to
be exclusive; it can encompass “any other similar agency designated by statute as a
Federal independent regulatory agency or commission.” 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012).
What is “similar” is hardly self-evident, given that the nineteen agencies are not
identical in their structural features.
20. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385 (1992) (lamenting that “the bloom is off the rose”
because “the rulemaking process has become increasingly rigid and burdensome”).
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day ever actually existed—the process of making new regulations today
often involves numerous procedural steps and the building of what can
sometimes be an extensive administrative record.21 New rules are also
always susceptible to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure
Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard, which effectively compels
agencies to justify their rules based on evidence and reasoning.22
For the most significant new rules, administrative procedures
demand that agency officials explicitly define the problem they seek
to solve, offer justifications for their proposed regulations, consider
alternatives, and estimate the anticipated benefits and costs of both
their preferred actions and other alternatives. UMRA and Executive
Order 12,866 impose precisely these sorts of analytical requirements
when agencies plan to issue rules having certain kinds of annual
economic effects in excess of $100 million (or higher for UMRA, due
to inflation adjustments).23 Under Executive Order 12,866, agencies
must clear their benefit-cost analyses of new rules through the White
House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).24 The
Executive Order further states that each agency shall “propose or
adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the
benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.”25
Statutes also contain additional analytical requirements. The
Regulatory Flexibility Act requires analysis when an agency expects a
new rule will impose substantial impacts on small businesses.26 The
21. Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative Rulemaking,
27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 533, 533–46 (2000) (charting the source of multiple steps that
agencies are required to take in order to engage in rulemaking).
22. For an agency to avoid a judicial remand under the arbitrary and capricious
standard of the Administrative Procedure Act, it must consider evidence and pay
attention to the likely impacts of regulation when promulgating rules. 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (2012); see also Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706, 2711–12 (2015);
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 31, 57 (1983).
See generally John D. Graham & Paul R. Noe, A Paradigm Shift in the Cost-Benefit State,
REG. REV. (April 26, 2016), https://www.theregreview.org/2016/04/26/graham-noeshift-in-the-cost-benefit-state (discussing courts’ expectation that agencies consider the
impacts of new rules and the increasing judicial receptivity to benefit-cost analysis in
the absence of a statutory prohibition on the consideration of costs).
23. 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a)(2) (2012); Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. 638,
641 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802–06. These requirements
not only do not apply to less significant rules but they also do not apply to executive
agency actions that are not formally rules but nevertheless may serve “quasi-regulatory”
purposes. See John D. Graham & Cory R. Liu, Regulatory and Quasi-Regulatory Activity
without OMB and Cost-Benefit Review, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 425, 426, 445 (2014).
24. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(B)(ii), 3 C.F.R. 644–45.
25. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(6), 3 C.F.R. 638–39.
26. 5 U.S.C. § 601.
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Paperwork Reduction Act calls for estimates of costs and time
associated with any paperwork requirements found in new
regulations.27 The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
demands that federal agencies analyze the environmental impacts of
major actions that will affect the environment.28 The Congressional
Review Act requires agencies to report to Congress and the
Comptroller General on new rules that would have an annual
economic effect above the $100 million threshold and to provide a
copy of any benefit-cost analysis prepared for those rules.29
Procedural requirements such as these reflect the sensible
expectation that agencies engage in analysis before adopting new
rules. Just as it is true in other consequential endeavors, it is better for
regulators to look before they leap.30 Conducting prospective analysis
can help reduce the possibility of mistakes, unintended consequences,
and wasted resources.31
All regulatory agencies must follow most, but not all, of the analytical
requirements applicable to new rulemaking in statutes such as the
Regulatory Flexibility Act and NEPA. However, the main analytical
requirements calling for agencies to conduct prospective benefit-cost
analyses of major rules do not apply to independent agencies.32 The
definition of an “agency” under UMRA “does not include independent

27. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3506 (2012).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 801.
30. See FRANK PARTNOY, WAIT: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF DELAY 240 (2012) (arguing
that “[o]ur most important policy decisions—about the economy, jobs, health care,
defense, the environment, and foreign relations—require that smart people spend
long periods of time thinking strategically”).
31. See, e.g., Susan E. Dudley, Make “Independent” Regulatory Agencies More Accountable
to the Public, FORBES (May 9, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
susandudley/2017/05/09/make-independent-regulatory-agencies-more-accountableto-the-public (urging President Trump to issue an Executive Order that will require
independent agencies to conduct impact analyses and submit proposed regulations to
OIRA). Even those observers who express concern over an undue emphasis on
benefit-cost analysis in the regulatory process recognize the value in prospective
analysis of some kind. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in its
Place: Rethinking Regulatory Review, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 335, 337–38 (2011) (seeking to
“challenge the hegemony” of benefit-cost analysis while still “favor[ing] technocratic
analysis that measures both costs and benefits in the most accurate way possible”).
32. On occasion, of course, an independent agency’s organic statute may require
it to conduct a benefit-cost analysis. Such is the case, for instance, with the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC), which must prepare a “description of the
potential benefits and potential costs of [any new product safety] rule.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 2058(f)(2)(A) (2012).
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regulatory agencies,”33 and the terms of Executive Order 12,866
expressly do not apply to agencies the Paperwork Reduction Act lists
as independent regulatory agencies.34
As a result, it should hardly be surprising that independent regulatory
agencies have come under considerable criticism for failing to conduct
extensive or even adequate benefit-cost analyses of many of their rules.
As Curtis Copeland notes in a report prepared for the Administrative
Conference of the United States, “studies indicate that independent
regulatory agencies often do not quantify or monetize regulatory
benefits, and often quantify and monetize only paperwork costs.”35
Richard Revesz observes that when it comes to producing benefit-cost
analyses of their rules, executive agencies are “more proficient,” and
“[t]he less successful agencies are independent and outside the
purview of OIRA review.”36
The evidence supporting such claims typically derives from the
reports of new major rules and their underlying analyses that independent
agencies submit to the Comptroller General, pursuant to the Congressional
Review Act. For example, Copeland reports that, of twenty-two major
rules that independent agencies issued in 2012, “[o]nly one rule
contained any quantitative benefit information.”37 OIRA compiles this
information in its annual reports to Congress and observes that
“[i]ndependent agencies still have challenges in providing monetized
estimates of benefits and costs of regulation.”38 Other commentators
reach much the same conclusion based on similar evidence.39

33. 2 U.S.C. § 658(1) (2012); see also id. § 1502 (incorporating the definition in §
658 into UMRA). The enacted version of UMRA does not define the words “independent
regulatory agencies,” but the conference committee report indicates that they were
intended to mirror the definition in the Paperwork Reduction Act, the only other place
in the U.S. Code where these words are defined. S. REP. NO. 104-2, at 31 (1995).
34. Section 3(b) of the Executive Order states: “‘Agency,’ unless otherwise
indicated, means any authority of the United States that is an ‘agency’ under 44 U.S.C.
§ 3502(1), other than those considered to be independent regulatory agencies, as
defined in 44 U.S.C. § 3502(10).” Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641
(1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802–06. The provisions of the
Paperwork Reduction Act have been re-numbered, so that the definition of
independent regulatory agencies is now at 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012).
35. CURTIS W. COPELAND, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
AGENCIES 4 (2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Copeland
%20Final%20BCA%20Report%204-30-13.pdf.
36. Revesz, supra note 5, at 560.
37. COPELAND, supra note 35, at 4.
38. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 4, at 32.
39. See, e.g., Arthur Fraas & Randall Lutter, On the Economic Analysis of Regulations
at Independent Regulatory Commissions, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 213, 236 (2011) (reporting that
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Despite this consensus about independent agencies’ analytical
deficiencies, it is actually more difficult than it may seem to assess
exactly how well or poorly independent agencies are doing in
analyzing their rules. The mere fact that these agencies report to the
Comptroller General that some—or even many—of their rulemakings
do not include quantified or monetized estimates of benefits or costs
only says so much.40 When researchers have looked in depth at the
specific materials prepared by independent agencies in individual
rulemakings, they have sometimes found that agencies have given
more attention to the benefits or costs of their rules than the
summaries they share with the Comptroller General might suggest.41
More importantly, analysts lack a clear benchmark against which to
measure the quantity and quality of benefit-cost analyses produced by
any regulator. For how many rules exactly is it reasonable to expect
independent agencies to have produced monetized estimates of
benefits and costs? The answer almost surely is not “all rules.”
Quantification and monetization of regulatory impacts are not always
possible because of a lack of data, fundamental uncertainties, or insuperable
conceptual challenges with respect to making particular estimates.42
Estimating the benefits of homeland security regulations, for example, has
proven more difficult than for other regulations because of the ex ante low
probability of the underlying problem and the likelihood of strategic,
adaptive responses by terrorists to any regulatory interventions.43 Taking

their “review suggests that the economic analyses prepared by independent regulatory
commissions do not measure up to those of the executive branch agencies”); see also
Jerry Ellig & Rosemarie Fike, Regulatory Process, Regulatory Reform, and the Quality of
Regulatory Impact Analysis 43–45 (Mercatus Ctr. Working Paper No. 13-13, July 2013)
(reporting study results that suggest independent agencies’ economic analysis is of
lower quality than such analysis conducted by executive agencies).
40. See Fraas & Lutter, supra note 39, at 218–19, 221 (noting that the Comptroller
General does not “analyze or comment on the substance or quality of rulemaking”).
41. See id. at 227 (reporting that rules issued by the Federal Reserve contained
greater attention to regulatory burdens that indicated by summaries); COPELAND, supra
note 35, at 111 (noting that, despite what studies based on reported summaries suggest,
“[i]n fact . . . the agencies often at least qualitatively discuss regulatory costs and benefits
(and often discuss at least some costs in quantitative or even monetary terms)”).
42. Kenneth J. Arrow, et al., Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental,
Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 SCI. 221, 222 (1996) (acknowledging that “not all
impacts can be quantified”).
43. Tanya Xu, How Should We Measure Terrorism Risk?, REG. REV. (Aug. 25, 2016),
https://www.theregreview.org/2016/08/25/xu-how-should-we-measure-terrorismrisk (discussing the challenges of applying typical analytic approaches to intentional
human behavior like terrorism).
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account of challenges like these, Executive Order 12,866 expressly
“recogniz[es] that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify.”44
Trying to assess the general quality of independent agencies’
prospective analyses by comparing their level of quantification or
monetization with analyses that executive agencies produce will be at
best suggestive. What constitutes quality analysis, after all, will be
specific to each individual problem that a new rule addresses, taking
into consideration the availability of relevant data. Some scholars have
argued that it is much more difficult to quantify the effects of financial
regulation, a domain dominated by independent regulators.45 In
addition, research indicates that agencies produce less thorough
analysis for rules that must be completed under tight statutory
deadlines,46 and we know that many of the rules that independent
financial regulators have issued in recent years under the Dodd-Frank
Act have faced such deadlines.47 Without controlling for factors such
as these, comparisons of independent agencies’ analyses with those of
other agencies will be incomplete and even potentially misleading.
Still, it seems reasonable to assume that independent agencies—
presumably like most agencies—could do a better job of analyzing the
benefits and costs of their new regulations.48 As Ryan Bubb has
suggested, it may be that benefit-cost analysis “plays little role in
financial regulation not because it is especially challenging but rather
because institutional structures do not produce incentives for financial
regulators to develop and employ” such analysis.49 If this is correct,

44. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(6), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994), reprinted as
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802–06 (2012).
45. John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and
Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 886–87, 997–99 (2014) (arguing against the reliability
and feasibility of quantitative benefit-cost analysis of financial regulations); Jeffrey N.
Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Regulation in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL
STUD. S351–S353 (2014) (arguing that benefit-cost analysis cannot be effectively
applied to financial regulation). Other scholars have contested the view that benefitcost analysis of financial regulation is infeasible. See, e.g., Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl,
Benefit-Cost Analysis for Financial Regulation, 103 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 393–94, 397
(2013); Revesz, supra note 5, at 548–49.
46. Patrick A. McLaughlin & Jerry Ellig, Does OIRA Review Improve the Quality of
Regulatory Impact Analysis? Evidence from the Final Year of the Bush II Administration,
63 ADMIN. L. REV. 179, 181 (2011).
47. COPELAND, supra note 35, at 4, 101–02, 111–12.
48. See Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, How Well Does the U.S. Government Do Benefit-Cost
Analysis?, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 192, 194–97 (2007) (examining seventy-four regulatory
impact analyses across three administrations and finding substantial quality shortfalls).
49. Ryan Bubb, Comment: The OIRA Model for Institutionalizing CBA of Financial
Regulation, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 50 (2015).
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then we should consider what steps Congress could take to change
those institutional structures so that independent agencies would have
more of an incentive to improve their prospective regulatory analysis.
Three main options can be considered.50
A. Make No Legislative Changes
Due to the demands that courts have started to impose on
independent regulatory agencies,51 as well as the generally heightened
salience of the issue of regulatory analysis at independent agencies
(including the prospect of legislative change), independent regulators
appear already to be taking some steps to improve their institutional
capacity for producing quality analysis.52 The SEC, for example, has
made notable strides in strengthening its economic staff in the wake of
the Business Roundtable v. SEC53 decision.54 The FCC has released plans
to create an Office of Economics and Analytics intended to “expand
and deepen the use of economic analysis” at the Commission.55
50. The options discussed below all contemplate general changes to administrative
procedures.
It bears noting that, if Congress wished to take a more incremental
approach, it could target just one or more individual agencies. To some extent, the
organic statutes of individual agencies already vary in that they direct some agencies to
consider—and others not to consider—costs when making regulatory decisions. See
COPELAND, supra note 35, at 4.
51. See Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis,
30 YALE J. ON REG. 289, 290 (2013) (describing how the D.C. Circuit “has set a very high bar
for economic analysis in rulemaking” for the SEC and other financial regulators through a
string of cases spanning twenty years); Eugene Scalia, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Reasoned Agency
Decision-Making, REG. REV. (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/09/26/
scalia-cost-benefit-analysis-reasoned-agency-decision-making (defending court actions over
the SEC’s mutual fund governance rule and its proxy access rule).
52. Kraus & Raso, supra note 51, at 327–29, 342.
53. 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
54. Kraus & Raso, supra note 51, at 292, 325–26 (explaining that “[t]he SEC began
implementing significant changes only in the wake of the Business Roundtable decision.
The artificial separation of the SEC [benefit-cost analysis] and [efficiency,
competition, and capital formation] consideration sections was finally abandoned,”
resulting in the publication of one analysis for each issue the SEC addressed, which
laid out the fact with the benefits and drawback of each proposed rule); see also Jerry
Ellig, Systematic Study Shows Improvement in SEC Economic Analysis, REG. REV. (Mar. 20,
2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/03/20/ellig-systematic-study-showsimprovement-sec-economic-analysis.
55. Fact Sheet: Establishment of the Office of Economics and Analytics Order, FED.
COMMC’N COMM’N (Jan. 9, 2018), https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/
Daily_Business/2018/db0109/DOC-348636A1.pdf; see also Ajit Pai, The Importance of
Economic Analysis at the FCC (April 5, 2017), http://s3.amazonaws.com/
media.hudson.org/files/publications/20170405PaiDOC-344248A1.pdf (remarks of
FCC Chairman Ajit Pai at the Hudson Institute).
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The first option for Congress, then, would be simply to wait before
doing anything further, as the quality of prospective analysis at
independent agencies seems likely to improve, at least to some degree,
on its own over time. Of course, not all independent agencies will
make the same strides. Another disadvantage of waiting is that, in the
intervening time, independent agencies will continue to make
regulatory decisions that could have important consequences for
economic activity and could be in place for a long time.
B. Codify the Requirements of Executive Order 12,866
for Independent Agencies
Scholars have long considered the question of whether Presidents
may legally apply the requirements in Executive Order 12,866 to
independent agencies, and Presidents themselves have been reluctant
to do so for the past thirty years.56 By contrast, Congress would not face
any such legal question if it were to codify the requirements of
Executive Order 12,866 and apply them to independent agencies.
This option would have the advantage of creating symmetry in the
analytical requirements for regulation by both executive agencies and
independent agencies. After all, regulations affect the public and the
economy regardless of whether executive or independent agencies issue
them. Legislatively imposing those requirements on independent
agencies would cure an anomaly in the law, providing independent
agencies with the same institutional structures and incentives for
producing quality prospective analysis as executive agencies.
Although subjecting independent agencies to the same
requirements for producing regulatory analysis as executive agencies
could be easily justified on the grounds of sound regulatory
management, applying the entirety of Executive Order 12,866 to
independent agencies would make a significant alteration in the policy
autonomy that has long been afforded to independent agencies.
Executive Order 12,866 does not merely call for agencies to conduct
prospective analysis; it also creates an institutional review process that
gives the OIRA Administrator, and ultimately the President, oversight

56. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Presidential Regulatory Oversight and the Separation of
Powers: The Constitutionality of Executive Order No. 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1235, 1258–
59 (1981) (“More difficult questions would surely be posed if the President were to
extend all the provisions of [the regulatory review] Executive Order . . . to
[independent] agencies, the heads of which are not removable at his discretion.”);
Revesz, supra note 5, at 586 (observing that no President has extended regulatory
review to independent agencies due to concerns about congressional reactions).
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and gate-keeping influence over agencies’ regulatory decisions.57 As
Executive Order 12,866 expressly states in numerous places, the
regulatory review process is one that aims at ensuring regulation will
be consistent with the “President’s priorities.”58 In addition, under
section 6(a)(3)(A) of the Executive Order, the OIRA Administrator
can ultimately determine which rules it will deem significant and thus
subject to regulatory analysis and review.59 In addition, section 8 of the
Executive Order precludes an agency from publishing a rule while it is
still under review at OIRA, and section 7 establishes a process through
which conflicts between OIRA and the agency head can be elevated to
the President for resolution.60
Legislatively applying the entirety of Executive Order 12,866 to
independent agencies would not only compel such agencies to adhere
to the Order’s principles for sound regulatory analysis—a laudable
objective—but it would also apply to such agencies the Executive
Order’s institutional and process provisions, several of which would
prove incompatible with the structure of most independent agencies.
The wholesale codification of Executive Order 12,866 would thus
present three concerns.
First, the wholesale application of Executive Order 12,866 to
independent agencies headed by multimember bodies would be
problematic because the procedures in Executive Order 12,866 are
drafted to apply to “the agency head.”61 Although it is conceivable that
the phrase “the agency head” could apply to an entire multimember
body that constitutes the head of an independent agency,62 the
Executive Order’s procedures are most naturally intended for agencies
headed by a single administrator. A multimember body simply could
not engage in the kind of back-and-forth interactions contemplated by
Executive Order 12,866.63 The practice of regulatory review under the
Order routinely involves a working interchange and dialogue between
57. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 640 (1994), reprinted as amended
in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802–06 (2012).
58. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 §§ 2(a), 2(b), 3(f)(4), 3 C.F.R. 640, 642.
59. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(A), 3 C.F.R. 645.
60. Exec. Order No. 12,866 §§ 7–8, 3 C.F.R. 648–49.
61. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(2)(C), 6(b)(3), 3 C.F.R. 647; see also
Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 7, 3 C.F.R. 648 (describing the conflict resolution process as
taking place between the President or Vice President and “the relevant agency head”
or “the head of the issuing agency”).
62. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 512–
13 (2010) (“As a constitutional matter, we see no reason why a multimember body may
not be the ‘Hea[d]’ of a ‘Departmen[t]’ that it governs.”).
63. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866 §§ 4(c)(4), 6(b)(3), 3 C.F.R. 643, 647.
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an agency head (or designee) and the OIRA Administrator (or
designee),64 a process which as a practical matter would not work well
with multimember bodies. If the entire multimember body were taken
to constitute the agency “head,” then the review process would become
extremely cumbersome. Merely determining an agency’s position on
OIRA’s feedback on the agency’s regulatory impact analysis would
presumably necessitate a meeting with all commission members in
accordance with various Government in the Sunshine Act
requirements65—including open meetings.66
Second, legislatively applying the entirety of Executive Order 12,866
to independent agencies would signal a major shift in the norms and
practices of autonomous regulatory decision making that have long
prevailed at independent agencies. The Order makes clear that any
conflicting viewpoints between OIRA and an agency about whether or
how to proceed with a rule “shall be resolved by the President.”67 To
the extent that operational autonomy for such agencies remains
valued, Congress should not apply wholesale to independent agencies
the institutional mechanisms in Executive Order 12,866. One alternative
approach could be to follow the model of the Paperwork Reduction
Act, which does subject independent agencies to some OIRA oversight
of their information collection efforts but which also expressly allows
independent agencies to override OIRA’s decisions.68 Another
alternative can be found in the proposed Independent Agency Regulatory

64. DONALD R. ARBUCKLE, OIRA AND PRESIDENTIAL REGULATORY REVIEW: A VIEW
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 68–70 (2008), https://works.bepress.com/
donald_arbuckle/1/download (describing back-and-forth interactions between OIRA
and agency officials); Sally Katzen, OIRA at Thirty: Reflections and Recommendations, 63
ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 105–07 (2011) (describing the normally collegial working
relationships between OIRA and agencies).
65. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012) (outlining the basic requirements for meetings of
multi-member bodies).
66. It is highly doubtful that White House officials would want to conduct their
meetings with multimember commissions in the open.
67. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 7, 3 C.F.R. 648. Of course, the same provision qualifies
the priority for the President by indicating that such a priority applies only “[t]o the extent
permitted by law.” Id. Furthermore, section 9 of the Order makes clear that “[n]othing
in this order shall be construed as displacing agencies’ authority or responsibilities, as
authorized by law.” Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 9, 3 C.F.R. 649. These qualifying provisions
could naturally be read to preclude the President from having the final say in any disputes
between OIRA and an independent agency because doing so would offend the agency’s
legal autonomy. If so, then this offers another reason not to codify unthinkingly Executive
Order 12,866 verbatim, for doing so would likely mean that the OIRA review process
would not have the same impact as it has for executive agencies.
68. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(f) (2012).
FROM INSIDE THE
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Analysis Act, introduced by Senator Rob Portman (R-OH).69 This bill
would authorize the President to extend the analysis requirements of
Executive Order 12,866 to independent agencies and to require them
to submit their analyses to OIRA for review; however, the agency would
not be bound, either by the statute or any executive order pursuant to
it, to respond to any feedback from OIRA.70 The agency’s analysis and
OIRA’s feedback would, however, become part of the administrative
record on judicial review, thus effectively requiring the agency to give a
reason for any departure from what OIRA recommends.71
Finally, even with changes to Executive Order 12,866 along the lines
of those in Senator Portman’s bill, the process of having the White
House review actions by independent agencies would still result in some
palpable shift in longstanding norms of agency independence. Congress
would do well to consider the practical implications that would follow
from assigning or authorizing White House review of independent
agencies’ regulatory analyses. In particular, such a shift would present
obvious institutional challenges for OIRA, which possesses a very tiny
staff compared with the many executive agencies it oversees.72
Legislation that would thrust responsibility on OIRA for overseeing the
actions of as many as twenty additional regulatory agencies would
necessitate a substantial increase in OIRA personnel and funding.
C. Eliminate UMRA’s Exemption for Independent Agencies
A third option for Congress to consider would be to remove the
independent agency exemption contained in UMRA.73 This option
would address the current statutory asymmetry in independent agencies’
analytical requirements vis-à-vis executive agencies, while avoiding any
questions or concerns about the White House intruding on independent
agencies’ policy autonomy. It would also obviate any need to increase
the funding and size of OIRA, as compliance with UMRA’s benefit-cost
69. S. 1607, 114th Cong. (2015).
70. Id. §§ 3–4.
71. See id. § 4.
72. Robin Bravender & Emily Yehle, Wonks in Embattled Regulatory Office are
Mysterious—But “Not Nefarious,” E&E NEWS (Feb. 18, 2014), https://www.eenews.net/
stories/1059994711 (“OIRA has a staff of about 44 people.”).
73. 2 U.S.C. § 1502(1) (2012) (incorporating the definition of “agency” in 2 U.S.C.
§ 658, which “does not include independent regulatory agencies”). At least three bills
have been introduced in Congress that would eliminate this exemption from UMRA:
(1) Unfunded Mandates Accountability Act of 2017, S. 686, 115th Cong. § 5 (2017);
(2) Unfunded Mandates Information and Transparency Act of 2017, S. 1523, 115th
Cong. § 5 (2017); and (3) Unfunded Mandates Information and Transparency Act of
2017, H.R. 50, 115th Cong. § 5 (2017).
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analysis requirement does not involve OIRA.74 UMRA simply imposes
a legal obligation on agencies to produce a statement of benefits and
costs of rules covered by the Act. This obligation to produce such a
statement is judicially enforceable, but the Act precludes courts from
ruling on the adequacy of agencies’ analyses.75
One small potential downside of this approach might be that
UMRA’s analytic requirements do not apply to as many rules as
Executive Order 12,866. UMRA’s threshold applies to rules that
impose $100 million or more in annual “costs,”76 rather than rules having
similar levels of what the Executive Order describes as economic “effects,”
a term which presumably encompasses both costs and benefits.77 Plus,
the $100 million amount in UMRA adjusts over time for inflation, so
today the threshold is much higher.78 Still, if UMRA’s somewhat more
limited scope were a concern, Congress could simply adjust the
threshold to make it comparable to the one in Executive Order 12,866.
The larger question about eliminating UMRA’s exemption for
independent agencies would be whether it would provide enough of
an institutional incentive for agencies to produce better quality
analysis. Although eliminating the UMRA exemption would not
provide for any institutional peer review role of the kind that OIRA
provides for executive agencies, UMRA does ensure that agencies are
required, under the threat of a potential court order, to prepare
benefit-cost analyses. Moreover, the analyses they prepare to comply
with UMRA can form part of the agency record and thus are reviewable
by courts under the general arbitrary and capricious standard in the

74. 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a)(2).
75. §§ 1532(a)(2), 1571(a)(2)–(3). Under section 1571(a)(2) of the UMRA, if an
agency fails to complete a required “statement” of benefits and costs for a qualifying
rule, “a court may compel the agency to prepare such written statement.” Id.
§ 1571(a)(2)(B). Section 1571(a)(3) states that “the inadequacy or failure to prepare
such statement . . . shall not be used as a basis for staying, enjoining, invalidating or
otherwise affecting such agency rule.” Id. § 1571(a)(3). In other words, UMRA
authorizes the courts to compel the preparation of a benefit-cost analysis, but courts
cannot, on the basis of UMRA, remand a rule because the agency failed to prepare
such an analysis or because a court finds the agency’s analysis to be inadequate.
Id. § 1571(a)(2), (3).
76. § 1532(a) (requiring economic impact statement for rules that would demand
an “expenditure . . . by the private sector, of $100,000,000 or more”).
77. The Executive Order defines a “significant regulatory action” as one that is
expected to “[h]ave an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more.”
Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802–06 (2012) (emphasis added).
78. See 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a).
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Administrative Procedure Act.79 For this reason, if the UMRA
exemption were removed, independent agencies would clearly have an
added institutional incentive to conduct benefit-cost analysis and to
take its findings seriously. A further advantage of removing the UMRA
exemption would be that independent agencies could no longer claim,
as they now do, that benefit-cost analysis is simply not required of them,
which could help in shifting organizational norms within these
agencies in a positive direction that promotes the value of producing
quality prospective regulatory analysis.
This third option—removing UMRA’s exemption—would offer a
middle ground between doing nothing and involving OIRA in
overseeing independent agencies’ regulatory development. Removing
the UMRA exemption would not disrupt existing norms of
independence nor would it demand the development of significant
new review capacity at OIRA. It would nevertheless advance the
objective of achieving legal parity between independent agencies and
executive agencies with respect to regulatory analysis. Pursuing a
middle ground, rather than going to the extreme of involving OIRA in
the work of independent agencies, would seem especially prudent in
light of the limitations in current assessments of the adequacy of
regulatory analysis at independent agencies.80 Moreover, it is
important to keep in mind that OIRA review has not cured all
inadequacies in regulatory analysis at executive agencies.81
In contemplating whether to take action, members of Congress
should focus on what steps will best promote improvements in
prospective analysis and regulatory decision making, taking into
account the values that Congress has long recognized in institutional
autonomy for regulators in certain policy domains, such as financial
regulation. In addition to giving overall consideration to the values
served by both analysis and autonomy, members of Congress should also
79. Section 1571(a)(4) of UMRA provides that “[a]ny information generated [in
developing a benefit-cost analysis statement] that is part of the rulemaking record for
judicial review under the provisions of any other Federal law may be considered as part
of the record for judicial review conducted under such other provisions of Federal law.” Id.
§ 1571(a)(4). Thus, although courts cannot pass on the adequacy of an agency’s
“statement” under UMRA, they can review the underlying “information” upon which
the statement is based when reviewing agency rules under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(2012), the arbitrary and capricious standard in the Administrative Procedure Act.
80. See supra notes 40–48 and accompanying text.
81. Coglianese, Empirical Analysis, supra note 11, at 1119–25 (reviewing the
available empirical research on the impact of the economic analysis required under
executive order and concluding that such a requirement “does not eliminate
inefficiency, and it may not even significantly reduce it”); see also infra note 85.
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keep in mind several other considerations when deliberating about how
to improve regulatory impact analysis at independent agencies:








Continue to recognize the practical limits associated with conducting
benefit-cost analysis. Currently, Executive Order 12,866 and
UMRA recognize that full quantification and monetization of
benefits and costs will not always be feasible for all
regulations.82 Any further legislative action should similarly
recognize these feasibility concerns and continue to allow
agencies the discretion to adopt appropriate regulations even
if some impacts cannot be quantified or monetized.
Take into account specific legislative mandates applicable to
individual agencies.
Some agencies’ organic statutes
preclude them from considering costs when making
certain regulatory decisions.83 Congress should approach
any new legislation imposing general analytic requirements
mindful of the implications such action might have for
these individual statutory requirements.
Recognize that conducting quality analysis demands resources. As
Shelley Metzenbaum and Gaurav Vasisht have written,
“Funding adequacy has a direct and profound impact on
whether a regulator can be effective.”84 If Congress takes steps
to mandate that independent agencies undertake additional
analysis, it should also ensure that these agencies have the
resources needed to fulfill any such mandate effectively.
Do not expect perfection. Even with mandates, regulatory
analysis will not always be completed well nor will it always
influence regulatory decisions to the extent that it should.
Despite decades of experience with OIRA’s oversight of
executive agencies, there remains substantial variation in

82. See 2 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (requiring agencies to estimate compliance costs only
“to the extent that the agency determines that accurate estimates are reasonably
feasible”); Exec. Order No. 12,866 §§ 1(b)(6), 6(a)(3)(C)(i)–(ii), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639,
645 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802–06 (specifically
“recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify” and requiring
quantification of benefits and costs only to the “extent feasible”).
83. See, e.g., Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (holding
that the Clean Air Act does not permit the EPA to consider costs when setting ambient
air quality standards). See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Factors Can an Agency
Consider in Making a Decision?, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67, 71 (“[A]n agency cannot
consider a factor that Congress explicitly or implicitly prohibited it from considering.”).
84. Shelley H. Metzenbaum & Gaurav Vasisht, What Makes a Regulator Excellent?
Mission, Funding, Information, and Judgment, in ACHIEVING REGULATORY EXCELLENCE 148,
153 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2017).
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these agencies’ compliance with best practices of economic
analysis of regulations.85 What I wrote over a dozen years
ago remains true today: “The available empirical research
indicates that simply mandating analysis does not eliminate
inefficiency, and it may not even significantly reduce it.”86
The Administrative Conference has reinforced these considerations
in recommending to Congress, should it impose new requirements on
independent agencies, that it “recognize that agencies need (a) the
flexibility to scale the analyses to the significance of the rules and
(b) the resources to satisfy such requirements.”87 Any effort to eliminate
independent agencies’ exemptions from requirements to conduct
regulatory analysis should be approached with thoughtful attention to
the conditions and capacities that agencies will need to ensure that they
can prepare sound analysis and take its results seriously.
II. RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS
The Obama Administration took a number of steps to build what it
characterized as a “culture of retrospective review and analysis
throughout the executive branch.”88 In early 2011, President Barack
Obama issued Executive Order 13,563, proclaiming that the nation’s
regulatory system “must measure, and seek to improve, the actual
results of regulatory requirements.”89 That order directed executive
agencies to develop plans for “periodic[] review [of] existing
significant regulations to determine whether any such regulations
should be modified, streamlined, expanded, or repealed so as to make
the agency’s regulatory program more effective or less burdensome.”90
In response, over about five years’ time, executive agencies
reportedly undertook more than 800 retrospective reviews and

85. Hahn & Dudley, supra note 48, at 206–07 (finding that the quality of agencies’
regulatory analyses varied greatly across agencies and from one administration to the next).
86. Coglianese, Empirical Analysis, supra note 11, at 1125.
87. ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE
RECOMMENDATION 2013-3: BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AT INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
AGENCIES 8 (2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Recomme
ndation%202013-2%20%28Benefit-Cost%20Analysis%29_0.pdf.
88. Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office
of the President for the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (April 25, 2011),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2011/
m11-19.pdf.
89. Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 816–17 (2012).
90. Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 6(b), 3 C.F.R. 217.
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eliminated over seventy “regulatory provisions.”91 According to thenOIRA Administrator Howard Shelanski, these efforts “achieved an
estimated $37 billion in cost savings, reduced paperwork, and other
benefits for Americans.”92 His examples of such cost-savings all
stemmed from regulatory changes at executive agencies,93 including
the now-famous EPA “spilled milk” regulation which effectively
exempted certain milk storage containers from particular EPA oil spill
91. Howard Shelanski, Retrospective Review, by the Numbers, WHITE HOUSE BLOG
(Aug. 31, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/08/
31/retrospective-review-numbers-0.
92. Id. A review of the Obama Administration’s lookback initiative that the
Administrative Conference commissioned suggests that many of these cost-savings
came in the form of administrative changes, such as switching to electronic filings,
rather than making substantive regulatory changes. JOSEPH E. ALDY, LEARNING FROM
EXPERIENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RETROSPECTIVE REVIEWS OF AGENCY RULES AND THE
EVIDENCE FOR IMPROVING THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF REGULATORY POLICY 52
(2014), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Aldy%2520Retro%2520
Review%2520Draft%252011-17-2014.pdf. A random sample of fifty retrospective reviews,
completed in July 2015 for a separate project at the Penn Program on Regulation, showed
that, in slightly more than three-fourths of the reviews that resulted in changes, the changes
were of an administrative or paperwork variety. Reducing unnecessary paperwork burdens
is no doubt to be applauded, but streamlining administrative processes is not squarely
centered on improving “the actual results of regulatory requirements.” Executive Order
13,563 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 215.
93. See, e.g., Howard Shelanski, Reducing Costs and Burdens: Further Progress in Regulatory
Lookback Effort, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (May 7, 2014, 7:05 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/blog/2014/05/07/reducing-costs-and-burdens-further-progressregulatory-lookback-effort (highlighting the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
change to a regulation, which was projected to save $3 billion over five years); Howard
Shelanski, Regulatory Lookback Eliminates Major Paperwork Burden, WHITE HOUSE BLOG
(Aug. 8, 2013, 12:42 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/08/08/
regulatory-lookback-eliminates-major-paperwork-burden (discussing retrospective
review at the Department of Labor (DOL), Department of Transportation (DOT), and
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)); Shelanski, supra note 91
(discussing retrospective review of regulatory systems at DOL, DOT, and
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)); Howard Shelanski, Retrospective Review: July
2015 Lookback Reports, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Aug. 14, 2015, 11:30 AM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/08/14/retrospective-review-july2015-lookback-reports-0 (reviewing the efforts to reduce regulatory compliance at the
Attorney General’s office, Department of Homeland Security, Department of
Commerce, Department of Interior, Department of Justice, DOL, DOT, EPA, and the
Small Business Administration); see also Cass Sunstein, Smarter Regulation: Reducing
Cumulative Burdens, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Mar. 20, 2012, 10:30 AM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2012/03/20/smarter-regulation-reducing cumulative-burdens (explaining that a DOL regulation adjustment will save employers
$2.5 billion). For additional discussion, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE
OF GOVERNMENT (2013). Sunstein worked on regulatory reform initiatives as the first
OIRA Administrator in the Obama Administration. Id.
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rules.94 But what have independent regulatory agencies accomplished in
terms of retrospective analysis of their stock of regulations?
In July 2011, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13,579,
stating that “each independent regulatory agency should develop and
release to the public a plan” for retrospective review of its existing
significant regulations.95 Eleven days later, the OIRA Administrator at
the time, Cass Sunstein, sent the heads of independent agencies a
memorandum in which he offered expressly non-binding “guidance”
on the President’s order, noting that independent “[a]gencies may
well find it useful to engage in a retrospective analysis of the costs and
benefits . . . of regulations chosen for review.”96 He emphasized that
“[s]uch analyses can inform judgments about whether to modify,
expand, streamline, or repeal such regulations, and can also provide
valuable insight on the strengths and weaknesses of pre-regulatory
assessments [that is, prospective analysis] which can be used to enhance
the agency’s analytic capability.”97
The White House Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) reported
that, as of November 2011, a total of twenty-one independent agencies
had developed retrospective review plans as called for by the Executive
Order.98 This included all the major regulatory agencies designated as
independent under the Paperwork Reduction Act.99 The CEA report
indicated that the independent agencies’ plans reflected “substantial
efforts to reduce burdens” and it highlighted review efforts taken or
underway at seven independent agencies (CFTC, FCC, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
Federal Reserve, Federal Trade Commission, and OCC).100 Although
the CEA report described most of the efforts at these seven agencies as
still at an early stage, the report indicated that at least the FCC had

94. Cary Coglianese, Taking Regulation Seriously, REG. REV. (Jan. 28, 2012),
http://www.theregreview.org/2012/01/28/taking-regulation-seriously.
95. Exec. Order 13,579, 3 C.F.R. 256 (2012), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601
app. at 817–18 (2012).
96. Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office
of the President for the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (July 22, 2011),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2011/m
11-28.pdf [hereinafter Sunstein, Memorandum on Executive Order 13,579].
97. Id.
98. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, SMARTER REGULATIONS
THROUGH RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW 10 (2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
sites/default/files/lookback_report_rev_final.pdf [hereinafter SMARTER REGULATIONS
THROUGH RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW].
99. Id. at 10–11.
100. Id.
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already “eliminated 190 rules, many of which are no longer needed as
a result of technological advances.”101
The rigor and depth of agencies’ analytic efforts in these
retrospective reviews, whether conducted by executive or independent
agencies, proved generally quite limited. According to a report that
the Administrative Conference commissioned, the “vast majority” of
executive agencies’ efforts lacked “formal retrospective analysis, such
as ex post estimates of benefits, costs, or efficacy.”102 What we know
about the independent agencies’ efforts makes them look still less
substantial. Most of the plans submitted by independent agencies
basically described existing, routine practices of consultation with the
public and intentions to keep abreast of developments in the regulated
industry.103 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for example,
took nearly two and a half years to take its initial retrospective review
plan submitted to the White House and approve it as a final plan—but
even then that final “plan” consisted only of a compilation of existing
principles and practices that guide NRC rulemaking activities.104 The
CPSC took nearly five years before it approved a brief document that
did little more than describe an internal process to follow, and
questions for agency staff to consider, in selecting existing rules to
review.105 Much as with the executive agencies, few, if any, of the
independent agency plans could be said to contain or call for truly
robust “formal retrospective analysis.”106

101. Id. at 4, 10. Undoubtedly this sounds like a major achievement in regulatory
reduction, but it is hard to imagine that the FCC’s actions could be attributable to any
serious retrospective review conducted in just the four months following the signing of
Executive Order 13,579. The timing of the FCC’s actions suggests that either these
revocations were already in progress before that order was issued or that the rules that were
eliminated were so obviously outmoded that removing them was an inconsequential
housekeeping matter.
102. ALDY, supra note 92, at 52.
103. Id. at 49–50 (explaining that, of thirty-nine independent agency rules issued in
2013 and 2014, “only eight monetized the costs of the regulatory action,” “none . . .
monetized the benefits,” and the regulations did not result from retrospective review
nor contain provisions for future review).
104. See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, FINAL PLAN FOR RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF
EXISTING RULES 5 (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1400/ML14002A441.pdf.
105. U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, RCA: PLAN FOR RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW OF
EXISTING RULES 6–7 (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/PlanforRetrospective
ReviewExistingRules.pdf.
106. Overall, a Senate Committee found in 2015 that agency retrospective review
“efforts had resulted in few completed reviews since the 2011 executive orders and that
better data and more planning would allow agencies to conduct better reviews.”
S. REP. NO. 114-282, at 4 (2016).
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It is far from clear whether independent agencies have made much
more progress over time in improving their retrospective analyses. For
the duration of the Obama Administration, anyone interested in executive
agencies’ progress could go to the White House website and find status
reports submitted twice each year.107 But no such repository ever existed
of the status or accomplishments at independent agencies. Indeed, it is
not even clear how many of these agencies ever followed through at all
on the initial plans they submitted. Executive Order 13,563—the one
that Executive Order 13,579 directed at independent agencies—only
called for agencies to produce an initial plan.108 Regular progress reports
on retrospective review were called for in a subsequent memorandum
from the OIRA Administrator109 as well as a subsequent presidential
order,110 both of which were directed just to executive agencies.
The Obama Administration’s regulatory lookback initiative aimed,
laudably, to build a culture of retrospective review through the
“continuing process of scrutiny of existing rules” fostered by the
presidential requirement of regular progress reports.111 It remains to
be seen, of course, to what extent the Administration’s lookback
initiative has contributed to any enduring cultural shift at any agency.
Although the Trump Administration has not made retrospective
analysis a centerpiece of its regulatory agenda, some commentators
have suggested that Executive Order 13,771—which calls for executive
agencies to eliminate existing regulations to offset the costs of new
regulations112—may provide additional incentives for agencies to
evaluate existing regulations.113 Of course, whatever positive, lasting
107. See, e.g., Retrospective Review of Regulations, WHITE HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/omb/oira/regulation-reform (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) (listing twenty-six
government entities and their status reports for 2015 and 2016).
108. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 app. at 816–17 (2012).
109. Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office
of the President for the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (Oct. 26, 2011),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/impl
ementation-of-retrospective-review-plans.pdf [hereinafter Sunstein, Memorandum on
Implementation of Retrospective Review Plans].
110. Exec. Order No. 13,610, 3 C.F.R. 258 (2013), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 app. at 820–21 (2012).
111. Sunstein, Memorandum on Implementation of Retrospective Review Plans,
supra note 109.
112. Executive Order 13,771 § 2(c), 82 Fed. Reg. 9339, 9339 (2017).
113. See, e.g., Sofie E. Miller & Susan E. Dudley, The Devil is in the Details of President
Trump’s Regulatory Executive Order, REGULATORY STUD. CTR. (Feb. 1, 2017),
https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/devil-details-president-trump%E2%
80%99s-regulatory-executive-order (“Although many [P]residents have encouraged
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change either the Obama lookback initiative or the Trump “one-intwo-out” requirement may have in terms of promoting retrospective
review at executive agencies, presumably any such impact has been still
more attenuated at independent agencies.
Clearly, more can be done to foster a governmental culture that
embraces serious retrospective analysis of regulations at both executive
and independent agencies. One desirable cultural shift would entail
refocusing and broadening the rationale for retrospective review. As
economist Joseph Aldy aptly notes in his report to the Administrative
Conference, burden reduction was a common theme of the Obama
Administration’s lookback initiative, as well as of similar efforts in earlier
administrations.114 The Trump Administration’s regulatory agenda
appears exclusively focused on burden reduction.115 Yet instead of just
focusing on reducing regulatory costs or burdens, retrospective review
should also consider regulatory benefits in an effort to help agencies
overall create better-designed and better-implemented regulations.116
Smarter regulation means not only creating more cost-effective
outcomes but also delivering greater overall benefits.
Retrospective review can provide valuable information that can be used
to inform future regulatory decisions.117 Multiple regulatory agencies,
executive and independent, face similar challenges, such as in regulating
to promote private investment in anti-terrorism security efforts to protect
key infrastructure, or in regulating to foster a “safety culture” within highhazard industrial operations.118 Retrospective evaluation research can

agencies to retrospectively review their regulations, President Trump’s [executive
order] may provide agencies with some of the strongest incentives for assessing the
costs—and the benefits—of their existing rules.”).
114. ALDY, supra note 92, at 34.
115. Unlike other executive orders on regulation, President Donald J. Trump’s
Executive Order 13,771 makes no mention of even the possibility of any benefits from
regulation, emphasizing instead just a need “to manage the costs associated with the
governmental imposition of private expenditures required to comply with Federal
regulations.” Exec. Order 13,771 § 1, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339.
116. Coglianese & Bennear, supra note 11, at 250–51.
117. Cary Coglianese, Measuring Regulatory Excellence, in ACHIEVING REGULATORY
EXCELLENCE 299–300, 305–06 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2017) (explaining why
measurement is essential for regulators to learn what works and to make smarter
decisions); see also Admin. Conf. Recommendation 2017-6, 82 Fed. Reg. 61,738–42
(Dec. 29, 2017) [hereinafter Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Learning from Regulatory
Experience] (emphasizing the importance of learning from experience in order to
make better regulatory decisions).
118. Reviewing Independent Agency Rulemaking: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Regulatory Affairs and Fed. Mgmt. of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs, 114th
Cong. 79 (2016) (statement of Cary Coglianese, Edward B. Shils Professor of Law,

2018]

IMPROVING REGULATORY ANALYSIS

759

fruitfully illuminate such common challenges among regulators working
in related areas.119 Learning how different types of regulatory strategies—
such as market-based instruments, management-based regulation,
behavioral nudges, or performance standards—have performed in one
regulatory domain can be useful in designing regulations in other
similar domains.120 Furthermore, by comparing the results of rigorous
retrospective evaluations of individual rules’ costs and benefits with the
prospective estimates that agencies make of these costs and benefits,
agencies and their analysts can learn how to improve the regulatory
analysis that takes place when agencies develop new rules.121
What concrete steps might Congress take to help independent agencies
better realize retrospective review’s full potential for deepening regulatory
knowledge and improving regulatory decision making? Three possibilities
merit consideration with respect to both executive and independent agencies.
A. Codify and Extend Requirements for Regular Reporting
on Strategically Focused Retrospective Reviews
The practices that emerged within executive agencies over the final
five years of the Obama Administration under Executive Orders 13,563
and 13,610 provide a foundation on which agencies could be
encouraged to build. To ensure continuation of these practices,
Congress could productively codify similar planning and progress
reporting requirements—and extend them to independent regulatory
agencies—helping to ensure that regular, strategic efforts of regulatory
evaluation remain implemented.
If Congress were to take such action, retrospective review practices
could benefit from a broadening of their purpose beyond the
worthwhile objectives of streamlining and burden reduction, which
have almost exclusively characterized retrospective review efforts in the
Director, Penn Program on Regulation, University of Pennsylvania); see TRANSP.
RESEARCH BD., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., DESIGNING SAFETY REGULATIONS
FOR HIGH-HAZARD INDUSTRIES (2017), http://nap.edu/24907 (examining several
industries that pose high safety risks and offering recommendations for regulating
those sectors); Cary Coglianese & Thomas R. Menzies, Designing Safety Regulations for
High-Hazard Industries, REG. REV. (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/
2017/10/04/coglianese-menzies-safety-regulations-hazard-industries (summarizing
and commenting on the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine’s
report on regulatory design).
119. Cary Coglianese, Moving Forward with Regulatory Lookback, 30 YALE J. ON REG.
ONLINE 57, 65 (2013), http://yalejreg.com/moving-forward-with-regulatory-lookback.
120. For a helpful discussion of differences in regulatory strategies, see Coglianese
& Menzies, supra note 118.
121. Coglianese & Bennear, supra note 11, at 251–52.
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past.122 In the Regulatory Flexibility Act, for example, Congress has
already required both executive and independent agencies to
undertake mandatory periodic reviews (at least every ten years) of all
rules imposing “significant economic impact[s]” on small businesses.123
The statute’s stated purpose for such reviews is narrow: “to minimize
any significant economic impact of the rules upon a substantial
number of such small entities.”124 Instead of limiting the focus of
retrospective review so narrowly, Congress could amend the statute to
encourage retrospective analysis that promotes smarter, more strategic
regulatory decisions—that is, analysis that measures and potentially
increases benefits, in addition to finding cost reductions. In other
words, Congress could direct agencies to design evaluations under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act that would support the goal, as stated in
Executive Order 12,866, of developing a better system of regulation
“that protects and improves . . . health, safety, environment, and wellbeing and improves the performance of the economy without
imposing unacceptable or unreasonable costs on society.”125
Agency officials currently have considerable discretion over which
rules to target for retrospective analysis and how to conduct that
analysis.126 Presumably any legislation codifying Executive Order 13,563
would continue to allow agencies to have the discretion and responsibility
to determine which rules to review, along with when and how to review
them, as these decisions will depend on each agency’s overall priorities
and available resources.127 Legislation, though, can help shape these
priorities in a direction that promotes public value through genuine
learning. For example, agencies might appropriately be encouraged to
analyze rules that they issued under conditions of high uncertainty

122. See ALDY, supra note 92, at 34 (recognizing that past reviews have sought to
streamline rules and reduce burdens).
123. 5 U.S.C. § 610(a) (2012).
124. Id. Executive Order 13,563 contains a similar purpose: “to promote
retrospective analysis of rules that may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or
excessively burdensome.” Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 6, 3 C.F.R. 215, 217 (2012),
reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 816–17.
125. Exec. Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601
app. at 802–06.
126. See Sunstein, Memorandum on Executive Order 13,579, supra note 96 (urging
agencies to “exercise [their] discretion to develop a plan tailored to [their] specific
mission, resources, organizational structure, and rulemaking history and volume”).
127. If Congress seeks to direct an agency to evaluate a specific regulation or set of
regulations, it always can do so through other legislation, as it already does from time
to time. In such cases, Congress may also need to consider appropriating additional
funding to support the desired evaluation research.
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about their costs or benefits, or rules that rely on common assumptions
or present common problems of interest to regulators.128
Maintaining OIRA’s current role in overseeing agency reporting about
retrospective review—acting as a government-wide clearinghouse of
sorts—would make sense for several reasons, even for independent
agencies. First, it could help ensure that OIRA staff can benefit from
the knowledge generated from agencies’ retrospective analyses. Such
learning would inform OIRA staff members in their efforts to oversee
executive agencies’ prospective analyses. OIRA staff would also be wellpositioned to articulate any government-wide best practices or other
methodological guidelines for retrospective analysis, much as OIRA
has done for prospective analysis with its Circular A-4.129
Second, since OIRA coordinates the implementation of the
Paperwork Reduction Act across the entire federal government,130
keeping its staff members apprised of independent and executive
agencies’ data needs may enable them to streamline any information
requests necessary to evaluate existing rules. Often the only way to
conduct meaningful retrospective analysis will be to require reports
or survey responses from individuals or organizations in the private

128. Cf. Coglianese, supra note 119, at 64–65 (recommending that agencies be
encouraged to evaluate rules promulgated in the light of uncertainty over benefits or
costs or in the face of common issues presented in multiple rulemakings). As a report
issued by the CEA has noted, “Retrospective analysis is an important complement to
prospective analysis. In some cases, prospective analysis of costs and benefits will be
highly uncertain; retrospective analysis can provide valuable additional information
and ultimately lead to better regulations.”
SMARTER REGULATIONS THROUGH
RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW, supra note 98, at 1. In addition, recommendations issued by
the Administrative Conference contain a further list of helpful considerations that
agencies may consider when prioritizing retrospective analysis. ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2014-5: RETROSPECTIVE
REVIEW OF AGENCY RULES 9–10 (2014), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Recommendation%25202014-5%2520%2528Retrospective%2520Review
%2529_1.pdf. Such recommendations could be usefully codified as criteria for agencies
to draw upon when planning and conducting retrospective analysis.
129. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4:
REGULATORY ANALYSIS 2–3 (Sept. 17, 2003), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf (identifying “three basic
elements” that every prospective analysis should include). Of course, independent
agencies would need to have the good sense to refer to and rely on these best practices
or guidelines, as absent any changes to existing analytic requirements these agencies
would not fall within the OIRA orbit. For a robust argument for making such changes,
precisely so that independent agencies can benefit from quality guidance from OIRA,
see Revesz, supra note 5, at 584–86, 588.
130. See 44 U.S.C. § 3503 (2012) (establishing OIRA within the Office of
Management and Budget).
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sector, the very kind of agency “collection of information” that the
Paperwork Reduction Act conditions on OIRA approval.131
Third, OIRA could incorporate overall progress and key findings
from agencies’ retrospective reviews into its annual reports to Congress
on the benefits and costs of regulation. Currently, these reports only
provide estimated or forecasted benefits and costs of regulation,132 but
Congress could also benefit from systematic reporting of ex post
identification of regulatory benefits and costs.
Finally, OIRA could be encouraged or authorized to issue nonbinding “evaluation prompts” to agencies, identifying specific rules
that would benefit from careful retrospective study.133 OIRA is
especially well-positioned to identify either particular rules or general
regulatory or analytical issues where evaluation findings could help
improve prospective regulatory impact analysis. Its role in making
suggestions to independent agencies about evaluations to undertake
would not intrude on such agencies’ core policy autonomy. Such
prompts could be stipulated by law to be completely non-binding for
independent agencies—and for executive agencies, for that matter.
Even if all four suggestions above were implemented, the overall role
contemplated for OIRA with respect to retrospective analysis would be
largely one of information aggregation. OIRA would serve as the
recipient of reports and the facilitator of learning. None of these
suggestions need disrupt prevailing norms of agency independence nor
require any dramatic changes to OIRA’s resources or staffing levels.
B. Require Agencies to Issue Evaluation Plans
when Promulgating New Major Rules
In principle, a well-developed regulatory impact analysis—the kind
prepared prospectively to comply with UMRA and Executive Order
131. § 3507 (codifying the requirements for approval of agency collection of
information from the public). As previously noted, independent agencies can
override an OIRA disapproval of an information collection request. See supra note 68
and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 2016 DRAFT REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY
COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 5 (2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/legislative_re
ports/draft_2016_cost_benefit_report_12_14_2016_2.pdf (“As has been the practice
for many years, all estimates presented in this chapter are agency estimates of benefits
and costs, or minor modifications of agency information performed by OMB.”).
133. See Coglianese, supra note 119, at 64–66 (proposing a practice of “evaluation
prompts,” according to which OIRA would identify rules that would present valuable
learning opportunities).
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12,866—will provide much helpful information that evaluators could
use to organize an evaluation of a regulation later. Still, as noted in
Part I, regulatory impact analyses are not always of uniform quality.134
Moreover, the exercise of completing even a brief, standardized
evaluation plan at the time of a rule’s establishment can discipline and
sharpen a decision maker’s thinking.
Such required plans need not be onerous.135 At a minimum, they
simply need to include: (a) a description of concrete criteria, indicators,
or proxies of regulatory impacts (specific benefits as well as costs); (b)
known existing data that could be used to measure the rule’s impacts,
or a statement of the type of new data that would be needed to measure
the rule’s impacts; (c) an estimated time period after which the rule’s
impacts should begin to be observable and evaluation would be
appropriate; and (d) sources of variation and possible research strategies
or designs, whether experimental or quasi-experimental, that could take
advantage, at the appropriate time, of that variation to try to draw
inferences of the rule’s impacts.136 OIRA could establish guidelines for
appropriate research designs and other plan features, which could be
instructive for independent agencies, even if not binding.137
In 2015, Senator Heidi Heitkamp (D-ND) introduced the Smarter
Regs Act, which would amend the Administrative Procedure Act to
require that when agencies propose a major rule—that is, one with
annual economic effects greater than $100 million—they also “include
a potential framework for assessing the major rule, which shall include
a general statement of how the agency intends to measure the
effectiveness of the major rule.”138 The bill—which would apply to
both executive and independent agencies—would then require
agencies to follow through with their plans and conduct assessments
of major rules in accordance with the time intervals and methods
provided in the agencies’ published frameworks.139 Even without
requiring these follow-on assessments, the mere process of developing
evaluation plans at the outset of a rulemaking could help reinforce an
134. See Hahn & Dudley, supra note 48, at 194 (reporting that the quality of regulatory
impact analyses across different administrations shows “a great deal of variation”).
135. Coglianese, supra note 119, at 62 (“An evaluation plan would constitute only a
small part of an overall [regulatory impact analysis], and it would be non-binding in
the sense that an agency would not be obligated to carry out the plan.”).
136. For a helpful discussion of agency options for the use of experimental and
quasi-experimental research designs to learn about the impact of their regulations, see
Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Learning from Regulatory Experience, supra note 117.
137. Coglianese, supra note 119, at 62–63.
138. Smarter Regs Act of 2015, S. 1817, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015).
139. See id.
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evaluation culture within agencies as well as provide useful guidance
for future evaluation of the rule by outside evaluators and the public.140
C. Invest in Regulatory Evaluation and Related Research
in Behavioral and Regulatory Science
Taking retrospective review seriously demands resources: time,
personnel, and funding.141 Limitations in resources present tradeoffs
between the breadth and depth of retrospective analysis. From 2011 to
2016, the Obama Administration’s lookback initiative took retrospective
review seriously by generally favoring breadth (number of rules reviewed)
over depth (the empirical rigor and sophistication of the underlying
reviews).142 By some estimates, executive branch agencies conducted
more than 800 retrospective regulatory reviews during this time period.143
That means that the average executive branch agency reportedly
undertook about thirty reviews, or about six per year, although a few
agencies reviewed over fifty rules, or more than eight per year.144 Most of
140. Planning for evaluation at the outset would be consistent with the Evidence-Based
Policymaking Commission Act of 2016’s goal of finding ways “to incorporate outcomes
measurement . . . and rigorous impact analysis into program design.” Evidence-Based
Policymaking Commission Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-140, § 4(a)(3), 130 Stat. 317, 318.
141. Cf. COMM’N ON EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING, THE PROMISE OF EVIDENCEBASED POLICYMAKING 88 (2017), https://www.cep.gov/content/dam/cep/report/cepfinal-report.pdf (“Federal departments must enhance their capacity for evidence
building to support the growth of evidence-based policymaking.”).
142. See ALDY, supra note 92, at 4–6 (stating that the Obama Administration focused
on creating a culture of retrospective review but also left room for improvement in the
quality and effectiveness of those reviews).
143. The Obama Administration’s final reporting on its lookback initiative claimed
“more than 800 retrospective review initiatives the agencies have identified as
complete.” Shelanski, supra note 91. My independent count of the entries listed in
the final July 2016 updates submitted by the twenty-six agencies actually yields fewer
than 800 regulatory initiatives, especially because some entries were for reviews of
information collection requests and other non-rule reviews. Connor Raso has
reported that, as of the July 2016 updates, twenty-two executive agencies had listed 459
planned retrospective reviews and 238 completed reviews—for a total of 697 reviews.
Connor Raso, Assessing Regulatory Retrospective Review Under the Obama Administration,
BROOKINGS (June 15, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/assessing-regulatoryretrospective-review-under-the-obama-administration.
144. Twenty-six executive departments and agencies filed reports indicating that
they had conducted retrospective reviews. Retrospective Review of Regulations, OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/oira/regulationreform (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). The averages reported in the text are estimates based
dividing roughly 800 reviews by twenty-six. Raso, supra note 143. In addition to
recognizing that these numbers are at best rough estimates, it should be noted that
they only apply to executive branch agencies. Id. Shortly after it launched its lookback
initiative in 2011, the Obama Administration did initially prompt some independent
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these reviews appear to have relied mainly on expert judgments,
impressions, and assumptions.145 Few, if any, reviews involved in-depth
empirical evaluation of the kind needed to draw valid inferences about
what impacts the regulation under review actually may have caused.146
The back-of-the-envelope nature of most of the Obama
Administration’s retrospective reviews is hardly an intrinsic flaw. Building
a portfolio of reviews that favor breadth over depth is certainly better than
not looking back at all. Even quick glances back in the rearview mirror
can be helpful. Moreover, an agency presumably does not need a
randomized controlled experiment, for example, to surmise that replacing
paper filings with electronic filings will save processing time and money.
Yet, a retrospective review portfolio devoid of any in-depth evaluation
research misses a critical opportunity to draw a causal connection between
regulations and intended as well as unintended benefits and costs.147
Regulations, after all, aim at causation. They seek to change behavior of
regulated entities in ways that reduce or solve problems. To look back
without trying to make any causal inferences is to miss learning whether
regulations are accomplishing what they are supposed to accomplish—as
well as whether they might be causing new problems altogether.
For these reasons, agencies need to conduct some retrospective
analysis that draws causal inferences about their regulation. They need
to engage in evaluations that compare the world with a regulation to a
counterfactual world without that regulation. Since counterfactuals
cannot be directly observed, agency evaluators must estimate them by
using careful research designs, such as randomized controlled
experiments, or by deploying various statistical techniques that
effectively approximate randomized experiments.148 Such research can
take time and effort to design and conduct.

agencies to submit plans for retrospective reviews. Exec. Order 13,579, 3 C.F.R. 256
(2012), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 817–18 (2012); see also ALDY, supra
note 92, at 42–43, 45. But the independent agencies were not required to submit updates
or progress reports on their plans, so a compilation or other ready source of the number
of retrospective reviews actually conducted by independent agencies is not available.
145. See, e.g., ALDY, supra note 92, at 52 (“The vast majority of status updates on agencies’
retrospective review programs do not include evidence of formal retrospective analysis . . . .”).
146. Id. Aldy also notes the “short time-frame” the Obama lookback initiative afforded
agencies to develop plans for and report on their reviews, a time-frame indicative of the
cursory nature of the so-called analysis underlying agencies’ efforts. Id. at 51.
147. See Coglianese, supra note 117, at 300 (urging agencies to perform “causal attribution
evaluation” for at least some regulations to understand more than actions or outcomes alone).
148. COGLIANESE, MEASURING REGULATORY PERFORMANCE, supra note 9, at 38–39
(highlighting statistical strategies that “can be used to estimate the counterfactual and
compare it with the existing state of the world”). See generally Jonah B. Gelbach &
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In building a portfolio of retrospective reviews, regulatory officials
need to make choices based on available resources. Not every rule will
necessarily require rigorous, in-depth evaluation. Banning the use of
lead as an additive in gasoline, for example, might not demand a
sophisticated evaluation to validate that such a rule caused observed
declines in air concentrations of lead, especially if few or no other
major sources of lead emissions exist.149 In many instances, though, it
will be important to determine what the actual benefits and costs of a
rule have been. Those benefits and costs, if properly monetized,
represent the value of the negative and positive impacts that the rule
has caused. Axiomatically, the only way to know what difference a
regulation may be making—whether for good or for ill—is to conduct
a careful, causally-oriented evaluation.150
Even when agencies are selective and strategic in choosing rules to assess
retrospectively, conducting rigorous evaluations will require adequate
resources. For some government agencies, these costs may be quite
palpable and Congress will need to ensure agencies have appropriate
budgetary resources. The needed resources, though, will almost always
amount to only a tiny fraction of overall estimated costs and benefits of the
rules themselves, especially when evaluations are targeted toward major
regulations. From the standpoint of overall social welfare, investing in
evaluation is worthwhile if it provides decision makers with options to lessen
the costs or increase the benefits of major regulations even modestly.
Congress might also consider ways that research capacities available at
other institutions—for example, at the National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine or the National Science Foundation—might
be used to help support the evaluation of independent agencies’
regulations. Other institutions could undertake or fund such research
directly, or they could provide more fundamental research in behavioral
sciences that indirectly helps to inform retrospective analysis. These efforts

Jonathan Klick, Empirical Law and Economics, in 1 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 29 (Francisco Parisi ed., 2017); JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE,
MASTERING METRICS: THE PATH FROM CAUSE TO EFFECT (2015).
149. Even if there were other sources, the pathways from fuel combustion to air
levels of lead may be sufficiently well-understood, and the adverse health effects of lead
so significant, that even a modest reduction from the air would still dwarf any adverse
effects of a ban, making an investment in causally-oriented evaluation seem less urgent.
Gaining a better understanding of other effects of a ban on lead additives, however,
would still necessitate causally-oriented evaluation, such as if it were thought
meaningful to know how the ban may have affected vehicle engine design and
performance, as such outcomes are almost certainly affected by other factors.
150. See COGLIANESE, supra note 17, at 66.
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could improve regulatory decisions by enhancing regulators’ understanding
of how and why different regulations have the effects they do.
CONCLUSION
Improving the quality of regulatory analysis remains an ongoing
challenge for all agencies. When it comes to independent agencies, it is
clear that requirements for high quality analysis—whether prospective or
retrospective—do not apply to these agencies as they do to executive
agencies.151 And yet the regulations that independent agencies adopt show
no meaningful disparity in substantive significance that would justify
continuing to exempt them entirely from analytic requirements.152
Independent agencies’ regulations are in fact highly consequential to the
economy and to overall societal well-being.
Closing the gap in the treatment of independent and executive agencies’
analyses would be feasible using options outlined in this Article. By taking
actions such as those presented here, Congress could encourage the heads
of independent agencies to improve their agencies’ regulatory analyses and
ultimately produce smarter regulatory decisions—even without causing any
dramatic diminution in independent agencies’ core autonomy. Taking
steps such as those discussed here would enhance the incentives for agency
decision makers to look carefully before they leap, as well as to ensure that
they look backwards from time to time to learn how well existing
regulations are working. Improving the quality of regulations issued by
independent agencies ultimately depends on improving the quality of, and
reliance on, both prospective and retrospective regulatory analysis.

151. See supra notes 2–3.
152. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.

